📌置頂文章📌 永社年度研討會:民主防衛與反滲透(活動已結束)

2017年4月27日 星期四

【活動紀錄】0422「檢察官不是行政官嗎?檢察官定位與檢察制度改革」永社司改系列座談會(一)


【座談會資訊】

時間:2017/04/22(六) 09:30-11:45
地點:台大校友會館三樓 3A會議室

主辦單位:永社、法操FOLLAW
Facebook直播:法操FOLLAW

主持人:陳傳岳/律師、永社名譽理事長
與談人:高宏銘/法操共同創辦人、律師、曾任檢察官
    范文清/東吳大學法律學系副教授
    鄭文龍/律師、永社理事
    吳景欽/真理大學法律系副教授兼系所主任

完整資訊請參見:http://taiwanforever2012.blogspot.tw/2017/04/0422.html


【影像紀錄】

現場直播紀錄:https://www.facebook.com/follawfollaw/videos/1765653837081988/
感謝 法操FOLLAW 協助攝影直播

影片清單連結:https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLgEHi_3unev2ElZIUplPwmhjHpyVneGTf

更多影片請點選「播放清單」檢視。




【座談會資料】

〈濫用他案簽結 恐成檢察官違法濫權之新棲息地〉,陳敬人,2015.05.06,法操
〈【司改國是會議滿月了】司改,思改〉,高宏銘,2017.04.05,法操
〈請落實法官檢察官評鑑制度改革〉,黃帝穎,2017.04.14,民報專欄
〈檢察官國家賠償究責之鴻溝〉,陳敬人律師、張雁翔律師,2017.04.20,法操



鄭文龍律師 講綱



【活動照片】


請見永社臉書相簿:
https://www.facebook.com/pg/taiwanforever2012/photos/?tab=album&album_id=1297883020295220


【相關報導】

檢察官是否屬"司法官" 民團辦座談討論
http://news.pts.org.tw/article/356336



婦聯會講不清的「違憲」勞軍捐

黃帝穎(作者為律師、永社理事)

民報/專欄 2017.04.26
http://www.peoplenews.tw/news/8dfbbac5-3b3e-41e7-8eae-69fe7c872723

21世紀的民主台灣,已不容違法違憲收稅,如同強取人民財產的組織繼續享有不法之財。(圖片來源:取材自國防部及郭文宏攝影/民報影像合成

行政院黨產會針對婦聯會召開聽證會,黨產會委員指出,聽證會聚焦婦聯會早期三大資金來源「勞軍捐」、「防衛捐」及「國民黨代領轉發經費」,釐清婦聯會財務等是否受國民黨實質控制,進一步對婦聯會是否為國民黨附隨組織進行認定。

事實上,暫且不論婦聯會是否為國民黨附隨組織,婦聯會收取「勞軍捐」、「防衛捐」並無法律依據,已違反憲法第19條稅捐法律主義,難怪婦聯會對其財產來源支吾其詞!

面對內政部的函詢,婦聯會多次以「年代久遠、無法提供」為由,拒絕向內政部交代勞軍捐流向。然而,媒體發現,現任婦聯會主委辜嚴倬雲在1995年擔任婦聯會秘書長期間接受媒體訪問時,非但承認勞軍捐有收支帳,還說要將勞軍捐餘額「在適當時機公布」,顯示婦聯會對勞軍捐流向並非不知情,「年代久遠」恐是推托之詞。

自由時報報導指出,面對外界對勞軍捐批評,辜嚴倬雲1995年曾打破承諾接受媒體訪問,強調婦聯會當年接受的「勞軍捐」完全都用來蓋軍眷舍、勞軍、援外等,沒有一毛錢落入私人口袋中,勞軍捐還剩餘多少,她不便透露,但將在適當時機公布。顯然,婦聯會違憲收取勞軍捐,並非沒有資料,但卻不敢提供給內政部,恐怕只是自知「違憲」而心虛。

事實上,中國國民黨成立的附屬組織中華民國婦女聯合會(婦聯會),因蔣宋美齡的私令,自1955年起的34年間,要求商家進出口每結匯1美元,就強制徵收台幣5毛做為「勞軍捐」,向台灣人民違憲徵收超過969億元勞軍捐,但這些欠缺法律依據的稅捐,金流迄今不明。

婦聯會違憲強取人民財產

退萬步言,就算婦聯會切割國民黨,自稱不是國民黨附隨組織,但婦聯會並非政府機關,更沒有法律受權婦聯會徵稅,因此婦聯會徵收勞軍捐、防衛捐,牴觸憲法第19條稅捐法律主義(租稅法律主義),國家基於「轉型正義」,追討婦聯會數百億元勞軍捐,「還財於民」誠屬民主政府的法律責任。

依據大法官釋字第706號解釋理由書揭示,「憲法第十九條規定,人民有依法律納稅之義務,係指國家課人民以繳納稅捐之義務或給予人民減免稅捐之優惠時,應就租稅主體、租稅客體、稅基、稅率、納稅方法及納稅期間等租稅構成要件,以法律或法律明確授權之命令定之;主管機關本於法定職權就相關法律所為之闡釋,自應秉持憲法原則及相關法律之立法意旨,遵守一般法律解釋方法而為之;如逾越法律解釋之範圍,而增加法律所無之租稅義務,則非憲法第十九條規定之租稅法律主義所許(本院釋字第六二二號、第六四0號、第六七四號、第六九二號、第七0三號解釋參照)」。

簡單的說,憲法規定政府要向人民收稅捐,必需要有法律或法律明確授權之命令定之,否則違憲,但婦聯會向人民收勞軍捐、防衛捐,完全沒有法律或法律明確授權之命令,當然牴觸憲法第十九條稅捐法律主義,也就是說,婦聯會違憲向人民收取稅捐。

尤其甚者,婦聯會向人民徵收勞軍捐,從事勞軍等公法任務,暫且不論婦聯會勞軍業務成效及財務是否受監督等問題,婦聯會要受政府「委託」行使勞軍等公法任務,必需要有法律依據,否則違法。此依據大法官釋字第二六九號解釋理由書,「依法設立之團體,如經政府機關就特定事項依法授與公權力者,在其授權範圍內,既有政府機關之功能,以行使該公權力為行政處分之特定事件為限」,但婦聯會受政府課與徵收勞軍捐及辦理勞軍等公法任務,從未「依法」,也就是說,婦聯會的收稅和受託辦理勞軍業務,完全違法違憲。

21世紀的民主台灣,已不容違法違憲收稅,如同強取人民財產的組織繼續享有不法之財。因此,行政院黨產會及內政部對於婦聯會的調查及後續處分,符合轉型正義的現代法治國理念,社會應予支持!

2017年4月25日 星期二

Anti-reform protesters a far cry from Sunflowers

Huang Di-ying  黃帝穎
(Huang Di-ying is a lawyer and director of Taiwan Forever Association)
(作者為律師、永社理事)

Translated by Perry Svensson

TAIPEI TIMES / Editorials 2017.04.25
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2017/04/25/2003669360

After the legislature on Wednesday decided to initiate the first review of the draft pension reform act, groups opposing the reform proposals began a violent protest outside the legislature. They even assaulted county commissioners, mayors and legislators entering the building and some of the protesters wondered what was wrong with that, saying: “If the Sunflower movement protesters could do it, why can’t we?”

In a play on words alluding to the Sunflower movement, these protesters are now being called the “No-money-to-spend movement.”

The guiding principle for the movement opposing pension reforms is to protect their own vested interests, while the Sunflower movement was fighting for a loftier reason — the public interest against the opaque handling of cross-strait service trade agreement negotiations.

There is no comparing the two, so the discussion should stick to whether the anti-reform protesters’ violent behavior is in line with a court decision that civil disobedience could offset illegal behavior.

The key factor that caused the Taipei District Court to arrive at a not-guilty verdict in the case against Lin Fei-fan (林飛帆) and the other Sunflower movement protesters for occupying the main chamber of the Legislative Yuan was that they met seven requirements of civil disobedience which offset any legal violations.

Applying these seven factors to the behavior of the anti-reform protesters who assaulted legislators and other officials makes it clear that they do not meet the requirements.

So, legally speaking, they cannot refer to the Sunflower movement verdict.

The fourth of the seven conditions for civil disobedience requires “open and non-violent behavior,” meaning that then-premier Jiang Yi-huah (江宜樺) could freely visit the legislature and engage in dialogue with the protesters without being assaulted by the Sunflower students in the way that officials and legislators were beaten by the anti-reform protesters.

The court’s sixth condition for civil disobedience was that there must be “an element of necessity, in that there must be no other legally effective methods available.”

The Sunflower movement was a protest against the cross-strait service trade agreement, and had the agreement been passed, there would be no more legal recourse for the students to address the situation, which was the reason why the court came to the conclusion that the protest met the necessity requirement.

If the pension reform bill is passed, on the other hand, the protesters would still have other avenues for addressing the situation — they could file an administrative appeal and even turn to the Council of Grand Justices for a constitutional interpretation of the decision.

The protesters against pension reforms abandoned seeking redress through legal channels and instead decided to beat up legislators and officials. This is not only an ugly way of defending their vested interests, but it also lags far behind the moral vantage point of the Sunflower movement.

From a legal point of view, the protesters against reform do not meet the requirements for civil disobedience, and they are fundamentally unworthy of comparison with the Sunflower movement.

Polygraph tests always unscientific

Wu Ching-chin 吳景欽

(Wu Ching-chin is an associate professor, chair of Aletheia University’s law department and director of Taiwan Forever Association)
(作者為真理大學法律系副教授兼系主任、永社理事)

Translated by Lin Lee-kai

TAIPEI TIMES / Editorials 2017.04.24
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2017/04/24/2003669303

Group one of the National Congress on Judicial Reform preparatory committee passed a resolution that would prohibit performing polygraph tests — commonly known as lie detector tests — on the disadvantaged, in the hope of protecting the rights of disadvantaged victims and defendants in lawsuits.

However, defining “disadvantaged” is problematic. Another issue to consider is whether a polygraph test would be more or less effective depending on whether the subject belongs to a privileged or a disadvantaged group.

The premise for polygraph testing is that the truth or falsehood of one’s statement will trigger a specific, uncontrollable, physiological reaction in the subject that can be measured and then interpreted by an expert. These assumptions may appear scientific, but they have always been controversial.

The doubts about performing polygraph tests mainly focus on their objectiveness: Whether the examiner is an expert, whether the polygraph instrument meets standards, whether the environment where the test is performed is normal; all these factors will affect the results of a test, and in combination with the fact that physiological conditions differ between people, the question is how there could be a consistent benchmark for evaluation.

Other scientific tests, such as DNA tests, are not affected by such factors, and such tests can be reproduced by other experts using the same procedure, which means that their accuracy is extremely high.

In comparison, polygraph testing cannot rule out many of the variables, which means that it does not have the reproducibility required by science, and the accuracy of the process and the results cannot be examined — a fatal weakness of polygraph testing.

Although practical criminal justice in Taiwan does not rule out this method of evidence, it does require that the examiner has received expert training and is experienced, that the equipment is of good quality and operates normally and that the environment does not interfere.

In addition, polygraph tests require that the subject is in a normal physical mental state. In order to keep the respondent in this state, examiners must inform the subject of their right to refuse the test and the possible effects of polygraph testing, and they must verify that the subject’s physical and mental state is conducive to conducting a test.

That there are so many requirements reveals the concern that a lie detector test carried out under duress will violate the defendant’s right to a defense and that results are likely to be distorted.
Although judicial practice has such strict requirements around polygraph testing, in reality these requirements might not be met, because the environment is controlled by the interrogator and the subject is alone. Even if the subjects are innocent, it is doubtful whether they would be in their normal physical and mental state.

Furthermore, there is no institution to issue expert certificates to interrogators and no objective standard for procedures, which raises the question of how polygraph results should be validated.

Even worse, polygraph testing is often carried out because prosecutors think defendants are not telling the truth. This creates a risk that examiners might be prejudiced and makes it difficult to ensure that they are truly objective. Even if the defendant does not confess, these factors would make it hard not to fail the test, in effect turning it into a confession.

It often happens that even if the subject passes the polygraph test, the authorities reject the result and send the defendant to another institution for another test. This not only seriously violates the defendant’s right against self-incrimination, it also raises suspicions that defendants are given polygraph tests over and over again to frame them.

The validity of the polygraph test in criminal trials therefore has nothing to do with whether the subject belongs to an advantaged or disadvantaged group. However, it is necessary to comprehensively review whether this technology is a matter of pseudoscience disguised as science and whether it should be banned from the courtroom.

After all, the mindset that if a defendant does not confess, they will be subjected to a polygraph test — and if they do not pass the test, they are guilty — violates the presumption of innocence and is possibly a source of injustice.

2017年4月22日 星期六

【座談會】0422「檢察官不是行政官嗎?檢察官定位與檢察制度改革」座談會


敬請報名:https://goo.gl/forms/1tRnASfeLUmhEU6x2

逢司法改革國是會議密集進行之際,各界對檢察官定位「究竟為行政官或司法官?」、檢察權入憲、檢察一體與檢察官獨立性、偵查不公開原則、檢察官究責、淘汰機制等討論非常熱烈,然包括檢警關係(雙偵查主體?) 、檢察官進場與退場機制等重要議題,司法改革國是會議卻反而較少觸及。為此,永社特別邀請專家學者,舉辦座談會,盼能提出檢察制度改善之建言,供司法改革國是會議參考。

時間:04/22(六) 09:30-11:45
地點:台大校友會館三樓 3A會議室
主辦單位:永社、法操FOLLAW

主持人:陳傳岳 / 律師、永社名譽理事長

與談人:范文清 / 東吳大學法律學系副教授
    高宏銘 / 律師、法操共同創辦人、曾任檢察官
    鄭文龍 / 律師、永社理事
    吳景欽 / 真理大學法律系副教授兼系所主任
    (邀請中)

時間分配:
 主持人10min
 與談人15min
 綜合討論 45min

敬請報名:https://goo.gl/forms/1tRnASfeLUmhEU6x2
活動頁面:https://www.facebook.com/events/205705243250210/

2017年4月20日 星期四

測謊有效性也分強勢弱勢嗎

吳景欽(作者為真理大學法律系副教授兼系所主任、永社理事)

蘋果日報/論壇 2017.04.20
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20170420/37624294/

司改國是會議第一分組決議,未來將禁止對弱勢者進行測謊,期能有效保障弱勢被害人與被告於訴訟上的權益,只是弱勢者如何界定,卻肯定是個問題。更值得注意的是,測謊的有效性,難道會因受測者是強勢、是弱勢,致有所差別?

測謊有效性的前提,乃基於人所言真假能夠引發特定的生理反應,且在個人無法自我控制下,這些反應能被儀器所測知,並為專家所判讀。惟此前提看似科學,卻一直存有爭議。

以對被告測謊的質疑,首來自於其是否有客觀性,如施測者的專業性與否、儀器運作是否合於標準、施測環境是否正常等等,皆會影響受測的結果,又在每個人的生理狀況皆不同下,如何能有一致的判定基準?如與其他科學鑑識,如DNA相較,由於此種鑑定不具有上述的干擾因素,也可由其他專家依相同程序為檢視,準確性極高。相對而言,測謊無法排除諸多干擾因素,致不具有科學所強調的再現性,就無法檢視過程與結果的正確性,致成為測謊鑑定的致命傷。 

我國刑事司法實務雖不排除此種證據方法,卻要求施測者須受有良好的專業訓練與經驗、施測機器品質良好且運作正常與施測環境必須排除干擾外,更得在受測者身心及意識正常的情況,才得為測謊。而為使相對人保持此狀態,施測者既應告知得拒絕的權利與測謊所可能帶來的影響,更得先檢視身心狀態是否適於受測。凡此要求,正暴露出在受迫情況所為的測謊,不僅侵害被告的防禦權,其取得的結果必也失真。 

違背無罪推定原則

惟就算司法實務對測謊鑑定有如此嚴格要求,卻未必能獲得實踐,因在施測空間為偵訊者所掌控,而受測者處於孤立下,即便是無辜者,其身心果能保持正常?甚且目前國內,並無對測謊者專業認證的機構,亦無任何客觀的標準程序,又何能檢驗測謊結果的有效性?

更糟的是,現行測謊,往往是在檢方認為被告不說真話或不認罪時為之,施測者即可能存有先入為主的偏見,致難保證其中立性。若被告仍不認罪,即難逃測謊未過的宿命,致等同是變相的自白。甚而於受測者已通過測謊之場合,但執法者仍不相信,致再送其他機關為施測,亦所在多有,既嚴重侵害被告的不自證己罪權,也讓人懷疑,一再送測謊,是否只為入人於罪?

也因此,關於測謊於刑事審判的有效性,實與受測者是強、是弱無關,而是該全面檢視,這種鑑定技術,是否僅是披著科學外衣的偽科學,致應被屏除於法院之外。畢竟,不認罪送測謊、測謊未過等同有罪的思考邏輯,絕對與刑事司法的無罪推定原則相違背,更可能成為冤罪的根源。

回答「太陽花可以,為什麼我們不行?」

黃帝穎(作者為律師、永社理事)

自由時報/自由廣場 2017.04.20
http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1095838

立法院昨進行年金改革法案初審,反年改團體在外進行激烈抗爭,甚至暴力毆打縣市首長及多名立委,部分反年改人士竟稱「太陽花可以,為什麼我們不行?」因此遭網友諷刺這是「沒錢花運動」

姑且不論反年改的「沒錢花運動」,活動宗旨只是為維護個人「既得利益」,與太陽花反黑箱服貿的憲政高度「公益目的」,根本無法比擬。僅論反年改的暴力行為,是否符合法院認定「公民不服從」的阻卻違法事由。

台北地方法院在太陽花學運的攻佔立法院案,判決林飛帆等人無罪的關鍵理由,是認定符合七要件的「公民不服從」,得阻卻違法。但用此七要件檢驗「沒錢花運動」的毆打立委、官員暴行,即可發現反年改群眾不符「公民不服從」,也就是說,「沒錢花」法律上根本不配引用「太陽花」。

法院的「公民不服從」七要件,其中第四要件是「須為公開及非暴力行為」,因此太陽花運動時,時任行政院長江宜樺可以到立法院旁與學生對話,且來去自如,不若「沒錢花運動」的暴力圍毆官員和立委。

「公民不服從」的第六要件是「須有必要性原則,也就是沒有其他合法、有效的替代手段可以使用」,太陽花反黑箱服貿,服貿一旦通過,學生無法透過司法手段救濟,因此符合必要性原則;相反的,「沒錢花運動」反年金改革,就算通過年改方案,既得利益者還是可以提行政爭訟,甚至是大法官釋憲來救濟。

簡單的說,反年改人士捨合法的救濟手段不用,竟跑到立法院來毆打官員和立委,這不只是「吃相難看」的維護既得利益,遠比不上太陽花學生的「護民主」情操。在法律上,「沒錢花運動」更不符合法院認定的「公民不服從」要件,根本不配比擬「太陽花運動」。

2017年4月17日 星期一

人權不准入境中國

吳景欽(作者為真理大學法律系副教授兼系所主任、永社理事)

自由時報/自由廣場 2017.04.16
http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1094705

國人李明哲,在中國以危害國家安全之理由被拘留,陸委會雖召開記者會,強烈要求對岸能依海峽兩岸共同打擊犯罪及司法互助協議(簡稱共打協議),通報與保障我國民之人身安全。惟就算回到共打協議,我方人員亦無法探視。

兩岸的人道探視,根據共打協議第十三章第十二點,於對方人員被限制人身自由時,既須及時通報,亦應給予家屬探視之便利。只是,共打協議並未特別針對兩岸的政治現實,而為特別的規範,致須依各自法律進行相關程序。

而就我方來說,依據刑事訴訟法第八十八條之一第四項,任何人被無拘票的緊急逮捕時,檢警須告知本人及其家屬得選任辯護人,這即是對親屬的通知義務。但同樣是無令狀的現行犯逮捕,卻無相類規定,實為嚴重的缺漏,亟待立法補強。而無論何種情況,於檢警對被告為偵訊時,基於偵查不公開,就僅能有律師在場。

至於被告受羈押之場合,依我國刑事訴訟法第一○三條第二項,必須將押票送交被告指定之親友,其並可依刑事訴訟法第一○五條第二項為接見。惟法院仍可以有湮滅證據或勾串證人之虞,禁止被告接見外人,惟此禁令,根據大法官釋字第六五四號解釋之意旨,不能包括辯護人。

故我國對人身自由受拘束的刑事被告,相關之通知與探視等規定,或有缺陷,卻已能降低與避免親屬陷入手足無措之境地。但對岸的法制,是否也有相對應的保障,卻有疑問。

依中國刑事訴訟法第八十三條第二項,公安機關拘留人犯後,須在二十四小時內通知家屬,惟若涉嫌危害國家安全之犯罪,就排除於通知範圍內。而中國刑法雖列有危害國家安全罪的專章,但其中的處罰要件,如顛覆國家政權、推翻社會主義制度或破壞國家統一等,皆屬極不明確的法律概念,即便如李明哲般,只是宣揚台灣民主及與維權人士見面,也會碰觸到對岸的敏感神經,致動輒得咎。

總之,在危害國家安全罪可恣意解釋下,對岸就算回歸兩岸共打協議之正軌,亦能依己方之法,正當且輕易排除對李明哲之妻的通知義務,更遑論有所謂探視權存在,致顯露出中國人權保障的現況。